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A PERSONAL PRELIMINARY 
I should begin with a few personal comments that may give some useful background to what 
follows. Like many other intellectuals of my vintage, I owe Vincent Buckley quite a lot. He 
taught me many things, often indirectly, and helped shape my outlook on Christianity and its 
implications for life. As an evening student at Sydney University, I had been involved in the 
Newman Society there and had read the booklet The Incarnation in the university, a sort of 
manifesto of the Catholic ‘Intellectual Apostolate’ associated with the Newman Society at the 
University of Melbourne. Although some of the orientation of Buckley’s chapter in the book 
was already familiar to me from the thinking that was going on in the Sydney Newman 
Society, the chapter, like much else in the volume, was inspirational and Buckley was clearly 
the major figure in a group of distinctive young thinkers. They had picked up progressive 
strands of theological and religious thought from overseas, notably from European thinkers 
like France’s Cardinal Suhard and the Dominican Yves Congar, and the Belgian priest, later 
Cardinal, Joseph Cardijn (founder of the Young Christian Workers organisation)  as well as 
American thinkers and activists like the founders of the Catholic Worker movement Dorothy 
Day and Peter Maurin, but they had also brought their own insights to bear, and in this 
Buckley was clearly the leader even though others made significant contributions. Their 
efforts were part of world-wide developments after World War II that loosened up the mind-
set and the structures of a Church that was stagnating without realising it and prepared the 
way for the liberation of Vatican II, a liberation that promised so much more than it has 
subsequently delivered.1   
Later, when I came to Melbourne University for postgraduate study in philosophy Buckley 
and I became friends and associates in the Intellectual Apostolate’s endeavours. We had a 
warm regard for each other, but there were also tensions between us, mostly about politics, 
and a certain distance as well. The distance was partly related to our different intellectual 
disciplines, but partly to my sense that it wouldn’t do to get too close to such a bright and 
intense flame. It illuminated, but could burn and blind. Also, when Vin was drinking, which at 
certain periods was pretty often, there was little point in being in his company. He was one of 
those people who moved very quickly from sobriety to broody drunkenness, and it could be a 
depressing experience for a companion who was still sober or relatively so. This depression 
was increased by the fact that sometimes his fellow drinking companions were acolytes given 
to mimicking the great man’s opinions and even their mode of delivery. Often enough this 
was a sort of rite of passage that allowed them later to find an outlook and a voice of their 
own, but it was irritating at the time. I don’t think Buckley encouraged followers particularly, 
but insobriety and the need for associated companionship gave them fertile ground. It still 
amazes me how much he accomplished in spite of his difficulties with alcohol.  
What follows is in two loosely connected parts. The first is a reflection on Buckley’s attitude 
to politics, with special reference to the politics of anti-Communism. The second is a general, 
philosophical discussion of some topics to do with the relation of religion and politics that is 
JASAL Vincent Buckley Special Issue  Coady: Religion and Politics 
 
2 
partly stimulated by issues which were prominent in the climate of the times when I first 
knew Buckley and by the fact that in the present intellectual and social climate those issues, 
or kindred ones, have emerged very sharply once more. 
In my experience, Vincent Buckley was fascinated by politics but the fascination was tinged 
with suspicion, discomfort and sometimes bitterness. As indicated above, religion was also a 
crucial concern, at least for most of the time I knew him, though the form that this concern 
took changed over time and the ambiguities and subtleties of faith that were present in his 
vision early on became more prominent in his later years.  
Vin liked to think of himself as an anarchist at heart and he was certainly wary of the 
pretensions of all forms of authority, whether clerical or secular. As far as I know, he wrote 
little theoretical on the relations of religion and politics; perhaps his most overt treatment of 
the topic was the famous editorial in the Australian Catholic Worker, of which he seems to 
have been the principal author, criticising B. A. Santamaria’s Movement. This was the first 
statement in a Catholic publication overtly acknowledging the existence of this secret, 
hierarchy-endorsed operation and certainly the first to raise some aspects of the Movement 
that were deeply problematic. Buckley remained an opponent of the Movement and 
strenuously resisted attempts to set it up inside the university. He gives an account of his 
reasons for opposition to the Movement in Cutting Green Hay, but it is rather a diffuse 
treatment, laced with extensive comments on the psychology of major participants in contests 
around religion and politics. His opposition to the Movement was all the more interesting in 
that he shared the strong anti-Communist stance that was the raison d’être of the Movement 
and he admired, indeed “revered” (as he put it) Daniel Mannix and liked Bob Santamaria. The 
respect for Mannix was shared by many Melbourne Catholic intellectuals, whether 
conservative or liberal, in a way that I personally, as something of a Sydney outsider, could 
never understand. In Vin’s case, it may have had something to do with Mannix’s Irishry, his 
strength of character, and the intellectual background that marked Mannix off from most of 
his episcopal colleagues in the Australian Church. Certainly the Melbourne archbishop had a 
presence and intellectual style that distinguished him from Sydney’s Cardinal Gilroy who was 
suspicious of intellect and devoid of anything that smacked of charisma. Mannix was also an 
individualist in a country that, despite its self-image, has a tendency to conformism. He was 
undoubtedly an impressive figure in many ways, but Vin’s portrait downplays the destructive, 
darker elements of his legacy. These include his powerful support of the Santamaria faction, 
and of course Santamaria himself, against those elements in the Church critical of the 
Movement, a support which extended to what was, in effect, an episcopal ban on the 
circulation of the magazine The Catholic Worker, and to acquiescence (at the least) in the 
widespread clerical vilification of the religious bona fides of opponents of the Movement.     
It seems to me that what Buckley objected to most in the Movement, apart from the dubious 
tactics it resorted to in the fight against Communism in the unions, was its attempt to employ 
the religious authority of the Church in a secretive way to promote partial political objectives. 
This was a form of clericalism, even though a principal agent in the campaign was a layman, 
so it misunderstood the relationship between Christianity and the world. This is a theme that I 
want to explore briefly in what follows. Buckley’s opposition to the Movement’s presence in 
the university also stemmed from his commitment to the autonomous significance of the 
intellectual life and the idea that values and projects should be tested against an individual’s 
lived experience. To him the Movement seemed to aim at imposing directions and values with 
an authority derived from elsewhere, and often without much sense of the lived experience 
and legitimate internal norms of the institutions it sought to penetrate. His critique here was of 
a piece with overseas thinking that sought to modify or replace the incumbent picture of the 
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Church as an institution with all the answers ready to impose them on a benighted and 
ignorant outside world. He thought that the central idea of Christianity was the Incarnation, 
the idea that God had in Christ entered fully into the human and earthly experience. Hence, 
the idea of the Christian or the Church standing apart from the world, judging and imposing 
from a safe distance, was foreign to him. Such a stance could only distort the values to be 
found in the world and trivialise the message of the Gospel. I recall his approval when I 
quoted from the theologian Baron von Hugel (a friend of the modernist Catholic thinkers in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) to the effect that the drama of the 
Redemption was a matter of ‘Christ in the Church calling to and answered by God in the 
world.’ 2 
 
BUCKLEY’S ANTI-COMMUNISM 
On the other hand, as I mentioned earlier, Buckley shared with the Movement a commitment 
to anti-Communism which became increasingly dominant, even strident, in his outlook after 
the 1956 suppression of the Hungarian uprising by Soviet tanks. Vin’s anti-Communism was, 
I think, only loosely connected to the anti-religious element in Communism, though his sense 
of the subtle presence of the sacred in the world made him unsympathetic to the messianic 
materialism of Communist ideology. More centrally, his opposition stemmed from a rejection 
of the totalitarian oppression and brutal persecutions that marked the Communist states and 
their rejection of liberal democracy, plus personal experiences of the manipulative behaviour 
characteristic of many Communists.  
This was of course an admirable rejection, but anti-Communism as a movement brought 
together some curious bedfellows and created some ugly phenomena. The most notable in the 
West was the McCarthyist movement in the U.S.A, but there were similar tendencies in 
Australia. Anti-Communists, Buckley included, were quick to recognise Communist 
subversion, spying and illegitimate violence, but blind or silent about the subversion, spying, 
and illegitimate violence of ‘our’ side in the Cold War. The Vietnam War brought this 
partiality into prominent focus, but there was plenty to take account of earlier and later, as 
with the C.I.A’s role under the banner of anti-Communism in the overthrow of democratic 
governments in Iran and Chile with appalling consequences for the people of those countries.3 
Nor should we forget the U.S role in the anti-Communist slaughter in Indonesia and its many 
government-authorised ‘dirty tricks’ in South America. Nearer to home, Frank 
Knopfelmacher’s anti-Communist crusade at Melbourne University gained favour with Vin 
whose approval of the man allowed Knopfelmacher to try to use the Newman Society in his 
smear and other campaigns against those he regarded as soft on Communism. This association 
with Dr. K. was one factor in creating tensions within the Intellectual Apostolate between 
those who were Cold Warriors and those who were not. There developed a sort of political 
orthodoxy which was not as stifling as that promoted by the Movement, but had something of 
the same character. Those who dissented from the Congress for Cultural Freedom orthodoxy 
seemed to be few in number, and were characterised by such dreaded expressions as 
‘neutralists’ (along with the leaders of India and other ‘non-aligned’ nations) or supporters of 
‘moral equality’ between the superpowers. Sometimes more extreme epithets were deployed 
such as the charming phrase Knopfelmacher used to describe me to one of my Catholic 
friends: ‘worse than human offal.’ It was characteristic of the fascination that Dr. K. exercised 
on his Catholic allies that several of my friends in the Newman Society passed this remark off 
as harmless: you had to understand that this was the way central Europeans expressed 
themselves, they said.  
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My own view was that Knopfelmacher was psychologically disturbed and his influence on 
students and some staff at the university almost entirely deleterious. One of the other things 
that particularly disturbed me and others (like Peter Wertheim, Bill Ginnane and Paul 
Simpson) who were opposed to Knopfelmacher’s influence and to Cold Warriorism more 
generally was the way single-minded anti-Communism tended to discredit social reform and 
radicalism at home. The alliance with right wing and conservative forces in our society that 
anti-Communist campaigns encouraged contributed to maintaining right wing governments in 
power in Australia at both state and federal levels for decades. Indeed, this was the primary 
raison d’être of the Democratic Labor Party (D.L.P), the party-political expression of those 
campaigns. The alliance meant that insufficient attention was given to dealing with wrongs 
that we could more directly influence at home, such as the plight of our indigenous people, 
poverty problems more generally, and the lack of independence and reflection in our foreign 
policies. I have sometimes wondered whether this imbalance was also related to the tendency 
in religious people to focus on great palpable evils, the evident work of the devil, so to speak, 
to the exclusion of those wrongs that are more diffuse and less obviously the work of evil 
people. In more recent times, George Bush’s indifference to homelessness, poverty and health 
problems in his own back yard while he pursued Evil incarnate abroad may be an example of 
this tendency. From another direction, the Iranian religious leadership’s obsession with the 
foreign ‘Great Satan’ provides a further example of the trend. 
The particular forms that Buckley’s anti-Communism took during the years of 
Knopfelmacher’s greatest influence explain to a considerable extent the reputation that he 
acquired in some literary and cultural circles as a man of the right. This characterisation 
irritated Buckley: he thought that his political stance was that of an independent with a 
sympathy for many left wing causes but with a suspicion that too many of the self-styled left 
refused to sail under the anti-Communist flag for bad reasons. As he put it in a poem critical 
of the Russian poet, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, he saw himself as someone ‘who had always 
walked left and thought Jerusalem’ (McLaren 177). Yet although he was quick to see the 
ways in which leftist hostility to capitalism blinded many intellectuals to the faults of 
Communist states, he was slow to see obverse failures of vision in critics of totalitarianism 
who couldn’t see the many horrors and follies that Western democracies committed in their 
single-minded Cold War policies. According to John McLaren, Buckley voted for the D.L.P 
in the Senate in 1961 and 1964 since James McAuley had persuaded him that the D.L.P was 
working for ultimate reunification with the A.L.P This not only showed extraordinary naivety, 
given the D.L.P’s tenacious support of successive conservative Coalition governments in 
order to keep the A.L.P out of office, but also a tendency to submerge all other political 
considerations to the cause of anti-Communism. This tendency reached its apogee in his 
reaction to the war in Vietnam. Until the later phases of the war, Buckley was a strong 
supporter of America’s war and Australia’s involvement with it. McLaren says that neither 
Buckley nor his friend Brian Buckley (no relation) supported the U.S mass bombing of 
Vietnam and Cambodia and sent telegrams to the U.S State Department saying so (204). I 
don’t know the evidence for this private protest, but I never heard either Buckley protest 
publicly about these events. If they confined their protests to such telegrams then the effort 
surely recalls in its naivety Dr. Evatt’s infamous communication with Molotov over the 
Petrov affair.  
Another powerful political interest that displayed rather different tendencies was Buckley’s 
concern for the Catholic community in Northern Ireland during ‘the troubles’ that began there 
(or re-emerged) in the late 1960s. As his commitment to Catholicism as a religion waned, so 
his involvement with the struggles of Irish Catholics seemed to increase.  This shift to a more 
ethnic or cultural commitment on behalf of the (mostly) Catholic traditions in his past made 
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for a more leftist stance, in that it allied him with a revolutionary struggle against British (and 
Protestant) power. It was, however, an irony of this alliance that it forced him into an 
endorsement of the I.R.A, a group which not only employed violence but, from time to time, 
terrorism. It might be argued that he never endorsed such resorts to terrorism, and it might be 
added that only some factions in the I.R.A were responsible for terrorist attacks. As to the 
first, I never heard Buckley publicly endorse I.R.A terrorism, but neither did he publicly 
denounce it, as might be expected of someone who had strongly opposed terrorism in other 
contexts, notably by the Viet Cong. As for I.R.A factions, it is true that some were more 
involved in terrorism than others, but none were totally free of its taint. This concern for the 
plight of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland might appear to have little to do with 
theoretical issues about religion and politics except for the fact that the ‘sides’ in the conflict 
were predominantly defined by religious categories, though these often masked ethnic, class 
and imperial divisions. But the background to ‘the troubles’ was itself something that 
involved religious persecution since being Catholic meant being excluded from influential 
public positions and access to power in a variety of ways. Sectarian memories and animosities 
were frozen in time in the North of Ireland in ways that had disappeared elsewhere.  
 
RELIGION AND POLITICS—EXCLUSIONISM AND ITS PROBLEMS 
One of the interests in addressing these matters involving Buckley and the Intellectual 
Apostolate is to get clearer about a host of issues to do with religion and politics. A primary 
issue is what is often called ‘the separation of Church and State’, and this was prominent in 
the controversy over the Movement. It encompasses several sub-issues. A simple 
interpretation, with some merit, is that, in a democratic, pluralist state no religion should be 
established by law. This faces the problem that in many such states, notably Great Britain and 
the Scandinavian countries, there is such an establishment. There are two responses to this: 
one is to say those states are in the wrong, and the other is to say that these establishments 
have such weak effects that they are tolerable because they respect the underlying principle 
that the state should disadvantage no-one by virtue of their religion. I favour the first 
response, though I see the point of the second, and so would not want to make a big issue of 
the matter. Another interpretation of the separation is what I call the extreme exclusionist 
view, namely, that religion and politics should have nothing to do with one another. This is 
clearly more radical than the first, though the impulses behind the two views are related. It is 
sometimes fuelled by the idea, which dates back at least to some views of the seventeenth-
century English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, that religion is too dangerous to be allowed 
any place in democratic (or other) polities. There have been many recent diatribes against 
religion that rely upon this idea, notably that by Christopher Hitchens and a variety of other 
atheist intellectuals. Another driver for the exclusionist view is that a pluralistic, democratic 
society can, as a matter of principle, only be a secular society. I have some sympathy with the 
impulses behind both of these ideas, but I think that they are too one-sided. This is for several 
reasons. In the first place, I do not think that the record of religion is as bleak as the critics 
say, or, at any rate, the violent tendencies of religion need to be balanced against two counter 
tendencies. First, there is the dreadful record of violence and abuse by secularist ideologies 
since the emergence of the modern secular state, most obviously the Fascist, Nazi and 
Communist states, though democratic states cannot be excluded entirely from the picture. 
Second, there is the record of religion on the other side of the ledger, namely, the remarkable 
good works that religious outlooks have inspired, such as the selfless work of the Salvation 
Army, St. Vincent de Paul and similar organisations, the prominence of religious people and 
leaders in peace movements, the many positive contributions of religious people to the 
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American Civil Rights movement and to the overthrow of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa, and these are only a few of countless examples that could be given. Nearer to home, a 
striking example of the powerful, salutary effects of religious conviction can be found in the 
commitment of religious groups to the support of persecuted refugees during the infamous 
detention centre regime of the Howard government, and also in the selfless compassion of 
small groups of religious people working with the aboriginal community. On the latter, a 
particularly pertinent Australian case study would be the life of Fr. Ted Kennedy who was a 
tireless friend and supporter of aborigines, mostly, though not exclusively, those who were 
urbanised and destitute. Kennedy had been a chaplain to the Newman Society at the 
University of Sydney in the 1960s, and was influenced by the religious thinking of the 
Intellectual Apostolate, though he drew upon other sources as well. After leaving the 
university, he became parish priest of Redfern, an inner city suburb with a big aboriginal 
population. Kennedy’s growth to legendary status with Indigenous Australians is well told in 
Edmund Campion’s recent book, Ted Kennedy: Priest of Redfern.  
A further problem for the extreme exclusionist view is that it is impractical. It would require 
religious people to treat their religion as a purely private affair, whereas for most religions the 
faith they involve has an essentially ethical and social dimension. Religion, that is, usually 
involves a world-view or at least a broad outlook that has implications for how to behave in 
one’s community and that must include implications for one’s politics. Moreover, it is quite 
unclear how a religious influence upon a citizen’s political thinking and activity could be 
legally excluded in a democracy. But perhaps the basic exclusionist position concerns what 
should be encouraged and discouraged rather than legally enforced, or what can be 
legitimately criticised from a pluralist democratic viewpoint. Even here, there would be much 
that would be excluded if religious reasoning and motivation were barred from any influence 
in the public sphere: the civil rights movement in the U.S.A, mentioned earlier, is a good 
example of an enlightened social movement that was inspired for many participants by an 
explicit religious commitment to the equality of all God’s children, regardless of race.  
There is furthermore a question of principle involved for democrats. If we deny religious 
reasons any role in public discussion and debate, then what are we to say of other ideologies 
or what the philosopher John Rawls calls ‘comprehensive doctrines’. Most, perhaps all, of 
these seem essentially controversial amongst people of good will; although they are open to 
reasoning, their validity seems beyond the determination of reasoning that must command 
assent from anyone who sincerely considers them. Philosophies like utilitarianism, 
Kantianism, feminism or natural law, or politico-economic theories like socialism or free-
market capitalism all have committed adherents and all have implications for public policy, 
but the grounds for accepting them can be quite opaque to outsiders. If we were to exclude 
religious considerations, motives and values from a role in politics and public policy, how 
could we allow these others to have a role?  
This complaint lies behind those criticisms by religious people who object to secularism 
having a privileged place in democratic societies. This complaint is, however, potentially 
confusing, and the confusion returns us to the earlier point about the separation of Church and 
State in a way that may be helpful. There is an ideology of secularism: we see it at work in 
various countries that strive to keep religious symbols out of public places, as the French, for 
instance, try to do in prohibiting the wearing of Muslim headscarves in public schools. But 
this sort of hostility to religious symbols is not required in order to give sense to a defensible 
idea of a secular society. A secular society is one in which no religious or comprehensive 
doctrine is privileged or mandated for citizenship and office. If it is democratic, or more 
particularly, liberal democratic, it is also one in which citizens have basic rights, including 
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civic equality, regardless of their religious outlooks (except where their outlooks deny such 
rights to others).  
Finally, if religious people are to play a part in public life and to exercise their religious 
values in doing so, are there constraints that both democratic politics and authentic religious 
impulses should put upon such a part? This is a huge topic that I can only touch upon here. 
The main constraints come from both political and religious understanding. Some of these 
are: 
Publicity and Non-manipulation. One of the things that worries people about the role of 
religions or ideologies in public life is not their presence but their covert operation. It is not 
that people object totally to the offering of exclusively religious reasons for policies, so much 
as they object to the operation of religious or other sectional pressures behind the scenes. 
There is an important publicity condition in a liberal democracy, and the philosopher 
Immanuel Kant was one of the first to see this. As I understand this condition, however, it is 
misconstrued as the offering of reasons that everyone could accept. It should rather be seen as 
the offering (and operating) of reasons that everyone can scrutinise. This should not only flow 
from a commitment to the equal respect that underpins democracy, but from religious 
doctrines about the respect owed to other persons. One of the things that disturbed Vincent 
Buckley, and other critics of Santamaria’s Movement, was the secrecy of its operations, the 
dissimulation of its leadership about the bishops’ role in its furtive activities, and the 
disjunction between its public professions and its private practices.   
The Value of Compromise. In a pluralistic society there are inevitably stages at which 
compromise must occur if policy is to proceed at all. The topic of compromise is difficult and 
sensitive, but the idea of compromise is an essential ingredient in all politics, and has an even 
more significant role in democratic politics in pluralist societies. There are I believe basic 
virtues, values and principles that should be beyond compromise, but the capacity to 
compromise on interests, goals and the implementation of values is not only a necessary 
ingredient in all political life and community policy procedures, but is itself something that 
contains positive moral elements. One of these positives is recognition of the complex 
realities that ideals, policies, and projects must engage with and overcome in order to be 
realistically implemented: this might be called the constraint of realism and it calls for the 
virtue of prudence. A second positive element is acceptance of the worth of others engaged in 
a common enterprise and this requires some acknowledgement of the values and 
commitments that give meaning to their lives. Clearly, these elements are also open to a 
religious endorsement.   
The Complexity of Value Conflict. Some of the value conflicts that bedevil public policy are 
indeed between groups who have profoundly conflicting moral outlooks, values or principles. 
Others, however, involve conflicts between values that are shared by the parties but are given 
different weights or interpretations. There is an important role for imagination in dealing with 
situations of this sort. Since human actions are multi-dimensional and can be variously 
described and variously justified depending on the angle of vision adopted, the parties to 
disputes about policy often appear to be arguing at cross-purposes, even discussing quite 
different actions. Imagine a debate about some action X that involves the application of 
science to human reproduction. If A thinks of his proposed action X as advancing the 
happiness of childless couples, and B thinks of X as endangering the institution of marriage, 
while C thinks of it as threatening the well-being of the children to be born of the procedure, 
they are likely to have very different attitudes to the proposal and are likely to reason in very 
different terms about what is to be done. To advance sane policy discussion, it is necessary for 
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all participants to abandon the blinkers that make it impossible for them to view the proposals 
under more than one or two favoured aspects. This is important because very different 
descriptions of the one act may all be true, or at least plausible. It is only when diverse 
perspectives are given due credit that underlying value divergences and agreements can be 
properly assessed and argued. This may require a difficult balancing of values that are 
recognised by all parties but are in conflict in a specific situation.  
The subtlety of religious conviction. It is a confusion common to both religious and non-
religious people to conflate the authenticity of a religious commitment with the authority of 
religious leaderships. This confusion is most pronounced in religions with a strong 
institutional structure, such as Catholicism or Shiite Islam, but it is also present in less 
formally structured faiths such as other versions of Islam, or the more loosely structured 
Hinduism or even Buddhism. In the case of Judaism some versions have more authoritarian 
internal relationships than others, and the situation is compounded by the peculiar position of 
Israel in defining (or seeking to define) Jewish loyalties and attitudes. On moral and political 
questions of any complexity, the diversity of judgement within religious communities is often 
quite pronounced, and this is also true even of central doctrinal questions. Religious 
authorities, such as popes, bishops, mullahs, immans and lamas, are understandably reluctant 
to admit the legitimacy of such differences, but they are of the first importance from the point 
of view of politics. In Australia, Cardinal Pell claims to speak for the Catholic 30 percent of 
the community on such matters as stem cell research, the morning-after pill, homosexuality, 
euthanasia, and various issues of national and international affairs. But Catholics are not only 
divided on these matters, but in fact very large numbers of them reject the ‘official’ line on 
contraception, abortion, I.V.F, stem-cell research, homosexuality, and various associated 
political matters. Perhaps they are not ’real Catholics’ in the eyes of some church leaders, but 
they identify as such, which is the most important thing from the viewpoint of the relation of 
religion to democratic politics. Moreover, Catholics who are ‘real’ enough to think exactly as 
does Cardinal Pell, or for that matter, the present Pope, on all or most of the matters 
mentioned above are likely to be a small part of that 30 percent. We cannot understand the 
role of religion in public life without appreciation of the subtleties of religious belief and its 
implications.    
And finally, there is the importance of reasoning, and listening to the reasoning of others, 
including those of different religious beliefs or of none. Reasoned discourse should be central 
to both politics and religion. Contrary to what is often claimed in anti-religious polemics, 
most religions give some prominence to reason in their religious outlook and this is inevitable 
since thinking is so engrained in all human activities that having reasons for one’s actions and 
thoughts is part and parcel of what they are and can be. This is not to deny the distinctive 
nature of faith or the varying weights that different religious traditions give to natural reason. 
Nonetheless, interpretation, no matter how unacknowledged, is central to understanding 
scriptures, traditions, authoritative pronouncements and faith itself. Reliance merely on the 
bare uninterpreted verdict of scripture, tradition or authority is not only unlikely to persuade 
others, but it can be false to the self-understanding of faith and the imperatives of growth and 
experience. These sources of insight were those that Vincent Buckley tried to place at the 
centre of his intellectual and spiritual life and his restless quest to embody them should evoke 
gratitude in all who felt his influence.  
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NOTES 
 
1 Buckley discusses this ‘intellectual apostolate’ and its significance in his Cutting Green 
Hay, and John McLaren analyses it in his book about Vincent Buckley, Journey Without 
Arrival. Edmund Campion has an interesting discussion of the foreign influences on the 
Australian Catholic intellectual revival of the 50s and 60s (with special reference to the 
Sydney scene) in his Ted Kennedy: Priest of Redfern. 
2 I have subsequently been unable to locate this quote in von Hugel and I have the slight 
suspicion that it should read ‘Christ in the Church calling to and answered by the Holy Spirit 
in the world’ but for present purposes this variation is not important. 
3 The C.I.A’s record of subversion of foreign governments and immoral covert blundering in 
foreign policy is elaborated in Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes: the History of the CIA. 
 
JASAL Vincent Buckley Special Issue  Coady: Religion and Politics 
 
10 
WORKS CITED 
Buckley, Vincent. Cutting Green Hay: friendships, movements and cultural conflicts in 
Australia's great decades. Ringwood, Vic.: Penguin Books, 1983. 
—, ed. The Incarnation in the university: studies in the university apostolate. [London]: G. 
Chapman, for the International Movement of Catholic Students, Pax Romana, [1957]. 
Campion, Edmund. Ted Kennedy: Priest of Redfern. Kew East, Vic.: David Lovell 
Publishing, 2009. 
McLaren, John. Journey Without Arrival: the life and writing of Vincent Buckley. North 
Melbourne, Vic.: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009. 
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: the History of the CIA. London: Penguin, 2007.  
